Quantitative Risk Assessment System Overview

March, 2004

College Park, Maryland

Introduction to Risk Analysis

- Determine potential undesirable consequences associated with use of systems and processes
- Identify ways that such consequences could materialize
- Estimate the likelihood (e.g., probability) of such events
- Provide input to decision makers on optimal strategies to reduce the levels of risk

Definition of Risk

- Risk is usually associated with the uncertainty and undesirability of a potential situation or event
- In order to have a risk situation, both elements must be present

Risk = Uncertainty and Undesirability

Risk = Likelihood and Severity

Risk Assessment

- Risk assessment is the process of providing answer to four basic questions:

  1. What can go wrong?
  2. What are the consequences?
  3. How frequently might they happen?
  4. How confident are we about our answer to the above questions?

- Answering these questions could be simple or require a significant amount of analysis and modeling.

Risk Management

Managing risk requires answers to the following questions:

1. What can be done:
    - to prevent/avoid risk?
    - to mitigate risk?
    - to detect/notify of risk?

2. How much will it cost?

3. How efficient is it?

Domains of Application



Systems

Processes

Organizations

People

Common Set of Principles Methods and Tools

NASA Risk Management Perspective





Mission Risk

Trade-off

Technical Risk

Programmatic Risk

Safety

Performance

Other

Cost

Schedule

Other

QRAS Overview

- Quantitative Risk Assessment System (QRAS)
- A software tool for quantitative risk assessment
- QRAS can be used to:
  - Build and Manage a Risk Model
  - Develop a Quantitative Measure of Risk
  - Answer Risk Management Questions

A Brief History

- Development at UMD Commissioned by NASA in 1996
- Version 1 and completed in 1997
- An application to Space Shuttle PRA was completed in 1997 by various NASA centers
- In 2001 Version 1.7 was released for beta testing by NASA. Space Station PRA model was used for that purpose
- In 2003 NASA and UMD gave commercialization license to Item Software

QRAS Design Philosophy

- Address large scale PRA models needs such as NASA space shuttle model
- Use leading edge, proven, technology in risk analysis
- Bridge the communication and skill gap between risk analysts, system designers, operators, and decision makers

Classical PRA Methodology



Figure originally composed by Futron Corp.

PRA Model Building with QRAS



Quantification Models
- Demand Based Models
- Time Based Models
- User Defined Models

QRAS Analysis Capabilities

- Risk Quantification, Point Estimate and Uncertainty
- Automatic Generation of Event Trees from Event Sequence Diagrams
- Risk Contributor and “What-if” Analyses
- Comprehensive Merge Capability

Creating System Hierarchy

- The System Hierarchy Manager is used to breakdown the system into various levels.
  - Root Level: Represents the system itself.
  - Elements: First level of decomposition. Represents high level functions or collection of subsystems.
  - Subsystems: Further detailed level. User can have any level of indentation defined by subsystems.

Creating System Hierarchy cont…

– Initiating Events: Represent the lowest level of hierarchy. These are the failure modes of equipments, hazards associated with equipments or effects of external events (like fire etc).

Mission Timelines and OTIs


QRAS - SpaceShuttle98 - [Mission Timeline]
File Edit Hierarchy Mission Timeline Failure Mode Quantification Event Sequence Diagram Analysis Sensitivity Analysis Tool Box Projects Help
Add OTI
Remove OTI
Mission Phase Editor
Add Phase
Delete Phase
Update
Print...
Save
Cancel
Unlocked

- Space Shuttle 98
  - Orbiter
    - Main Propulsion System
      - Failure of Required Function
        - MPS H2 Feed System Valve Closes During
        - MPS O2 Feed System Valve Closes During
        - MPS O2 Prevalve Fails to Close at MECO
        - MPS Discon Vlv (17") Fails to Close At ETS
        - MPS Discon Vlv (17") Fails to Close-Bad In
        - MPS Feed System Valves Closes During A
        - MPS Inboard H2 Fill/Drain Valve Opens Du
        - MPS Inboard O2 Fill/Drain Valve Opens Du
      - Off-Nominal Events
        - MPS He Loss, Pneumatic, Leads to Aft Ove
        - MPS He Loss, Pneumatic, No Aft Overpres
        - MPS He Loss, Right Engine, Leads to Aft O
        - MPS He Loss, Right Engine, No Aft Overpre
        - MPS He Loss, Center Engine, Leads to Aft
        - MPS He Loss, Center Engine, No Aft Overp
        - MPS He Loss, Left Engine, Leads to Aft Ove
        - MPS He Loss, Left Engine, No Aft Overpres
        - MPS He Leak, Prop Prepress, Leads to Aft
        - MPS H2 Leak
        - MPS O2 Leak
        - MPS N2 Leak
        - MPS Uncontained Engine Damage
        - MPS Feed System Contamination
        - MPS Gaseous O2 System Contamination
        - MPS External Tank Gaseous O2 Press Not
        - MPS Propellant Line Overpress
    - Orbital Maneuvering System
      - OMS/RCS Common
        - Fuel Leak in Crossfeed Line
      - Right OMS
        - ROMS Helium Leak
        - ROMS Helium Check Valve Blockage
        - ROMS Nitrogen Tank Leak
        - ROMS Fuel Leak into Right Pod
        - ROMS Pad Failure
        - ROMS Engine Burnthrough
        - ROMS Gimbal Structure Failure
        - ROMS Engine Restricted Flow
      - Left OMS
        - LOMS Helium Leak
        - LOMS Helium Check Valve Blockage
        - LOMS Nitrogen Tank Leak
        - LOMS Fuel Leak into Left Pod
        - LOMS Pad Failure
        - LOMS Engine Burnthrough
        - LOMS Gimbal Structure Failure
        - LOMS Engine Restricted Flow

Mission Phases: 1: Ascent

Current Mission Phase Time

Start: -300
End: 780
Unit: S

Operational Time Interval(s) for Failure of Required Function

OTI	Start	End	Unit
Operational Time Interval 1	0.00	510.00	S
Operational Time Interval 2	510.00	780.00	S

Mission Phase(s):

1: Ascent

Phase Information

Phase Name: Ascent

Start Time: -6 Unit: S

End Time: 5.14E+2

Event Sequence Diagram

- Initiators are starting point of risk scenarios
  - E.g. maintenance operation
- Pivotal event are major events describing determining outcome
  - E.g. procedural steps
- End states are used to classify outcome of scenarios



User-Definable End States

- Number and type of end states can be tailored to specific problem needs



End State Type Definitions

ID	Designator	Description	Computed	Comment
1	MS	Mission Success	□	
2	CAT1	CAT 1 Failure	☒	
3	CAT2	CAT 2 Failure	☒	
4	CAT3	CAT 3 Failure	☒	

ESD Transfer Points

- ESD portions can be reused when scenarios can be combined



Mission Phase	OTI	Start	End	Unit	App
MP1	1	0.00	100.00	S	☒

Assigning Quantification Models

- Type of the quantification model can be:
  - Instantaneous
  - Success/Failure Type
  - Time Based
  - Fault Tree

Quantification of Events

- Uncertainty distributions are used to define the probabilities of events



Quantification Model Selection [#0047 v 01-05]

Name: progress-air-vlv-e2

Designator: p-air-vlv2

Select Type of Event / Quantification Model:

Demand Based

Instantaneous (at time t_0)

○ Time t_0 = 0.00 S

○ Time t_0 not specified

○ Success/Failure - viewed over entire time interval

Time Based

● Time-Distributed

Reliability Function (Exponential)

Duration: 2.160E+3

Unit of Duration: H



Time Distributed / Reliability Function (Exponential)

Name: progress-air-vlv-e2

Designator: p-air-vlv2

Select Distribution for lambda: Lognormal

$R(t) = e^{-\lambda t}$

Lambda unit: 1 / H

Mode of Input: Mean/Error Factor

Mean: 1.440041E-6

Error Factor: 3.740451

Link with External Tools

- Flexible definition of models through link with Mathematica



Demand Based / Function of Variables

Name: Occupational Hazard Injury

Designator: Initiating Event

Define Variables

Symbol	Description	Density Model
b		Beta
t		Lognormal
lambda		Lognormal

Define Function:

f(x) = b*(1-Exp[-t*lambda])

Use of Fault Trees for Quantification

Initiating Events and Pivotal Events can be quantified using Fault Trees



$$IE \cdot PE1$$

$$IE \cdot \overline{PE1}$$

Adding Detail to ESD Nodes

- Decomposition of events by means of fault trees



POS FAILURE	Position
POWER	Loss of I
THRUST	Thruster
WEATHER	Severe \

Current Objects Properties:

Designator:
Top Event

Name:
FT

Probability mean value:
1.099E-02

☑ Valid

☑ Quantification Exists

Description:

Solving and Analyzing Fault Trees

- Fault Trees can be solved for the point estimate probability at any gate level.
- Fault Tree cut sets can be computed at any gate level.
- Fault Tree uncertainty analysis can be performed at the top event level, after solving the top event.

Binary Decision Diagrams in QRAS

- Algorithms to perform analyses have been implemented using Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) techniques
- Cut-sets and event/scenario probabilities are derived from the BDDs
- Now regarded most powerful approach for fault tree analysis

Advantages of BDDs

- BDD-based algorithms offer advantages in terms of accuracy and efficiency:
  - ‘Efficient manipulation of logic’: extremely fast cut-set identification
  - ‘Straightforward treatment of incoherent logic’: consideration of negated fault trees during scenario analysis
  - ‘Exact quantification’: no need to use rare-event type approximations

Size of BDD Encoding of Cut Sets

- There is no strong relationship between number of cuts and the amount of memory to store the BDD-type encoding

- Similarly, no strong relationship between number of cuts and the computation time

Cut-Set Identification in QRAS

- QRAS could possibly identify billions of cuts within seconds
- QRAS guards against attempts to extract too many cuts
  - Constructs the BDD encoding
  - Compares number of cuts against user-specified threshold
  - If below threshold, extracts, sorts, and displays cuts

Truncated Cut-Set Identification

- The search for cut-sets can be limited to significant cuts

- Only identify cuts with specified
  - Maximum order: number of basic events
  - Minimum probability: product of event probabilities

- Takes place during conversion of the BDD

Cut-Set Identification Performance

- Computation time for some real fault trees
  - In seconds, on a 500MHz Pentium 3, 256MB RAM

MAX ORDER	MIN PROB	# CUTS	TIME
-	-	33,983,088	8
6	-	21,802	1
9	-	440,093	13
12	-	3,009,332	300
-	1.00E-12	6,963	1
-	1.00E-18	268,381	18
6	1.00E-12	4,601	1
9	1.00E-18	179237	20

Cut-Set Identification Performance

	MAX ORDER	MIN PROB	# CUTS	TIME
FAULT TREE 2	-	-	>1 billion	1
	4	-	2546	1
	6	-	15,542,373	15
	9	-	-	>1 hour
	-	1.00E-06	12914	1
	-	1.00E-09	880429	7
	-	1.00E-12	13,740,522	150
	4	1.00E-06	0	1
	6	1.00E-12	2,408,779	60
FAULT TREE 3	-	-	4,181,090	1
	6	-	117,394	1
	9	-	1,073,301	2
	12	-	3,013,018	9
	-	1.00E-12	9,088	1
	-	1.00E-18	123,020	1
	6	1.00E-12	8,806	1
	9	1.00E-18	118837	3

Example: Comparison of Quantification

- Table illustrates varying impact of approximation and truncation in practical cases

	BDD	CUT-SET BASED APPROXIMATION			
		1.00E-08	1.00E-12	1.00E-15	NONE
1	6.53E-08	0.00E+00	6.66E-08	6.71E-08	6.71E-08
2	1.73E-05	1.59E-05	1.94E-05	1.94E-05	1.94E-05
3	3.97E-09	0.00E+00	3.64E-09	5.61E-09	-
4	2.86E-06	1.15E-06	9.66E-06	-	-
5	1.94E-05	2.26E-05	2.29E-06	2.29E-05	-
6	5.94E-07	3.07E-07	1.23E-06	1.25E-06	-
7	5.41E-06	5.76E-06	7.37E-06	7.13E-06	-
8	3.19E-06	3.90E-06	3.90E-06	4.54E-06	-
9	3.48E-10	0.00E+00	3.25E-10	5.29E-10	-
10	4.01E-07	4.50E-07	9.40E-07	9.48E-07	-

Cut-Set Truncation and Quantification

- Truncation during cut-set identification does not affect the quantification
  - – Quantification derived directly from BDD



Fault Tree Uncertainty

- Fault Tree Uncertainty Analysis consists of a Monte Carlo procedure in which the BDD probability is repeatedly evaluated
  - Event probabilities sampled from respective distributions
  - Outcomes used to construct distribution

Common Cause Failure Modeling



Single definition of CC Group

Automatic expansion of all affected basic events

Common Cause Fault Tree Expansion



TSensor2	H2 Tem
FSensor 1	H2 Fill S
PSensor 2	Pressur
PSensor1	Pressur
LSensor1	Load H2
LSensor2	Load H2
LSensor3	Load H2
TSensor3	H2 Tem
TSensor1	H2 Tem
Valve1	Load H2

Current Objects Properties:

Designator:
Top Event

Name:
Prop Load complete?

Probability mean value:
4.489E-02

☑ Valid
☑ Quantification Exists

Description:

FSensor 1	H2 Fill S
LSensor2	Load H2
LSensor3	Load H2
PSensor 2	Pressur
TSensor2	H2 Tem
TSensor3	H2 Tem
Valve1	Load H2

Current Objects Properties:

Designator:
Top Event

Name:
Prop Load complete?

Probability mean value:
8.106E-02

☑ Valid
☑ Quantification Exists

Description:

Creating/Running an Analysis

- All standard analyses are run from the **Analysis** top-of-screen menu option. Note that the pull-down menu for **Analysis** contains the following four options:
  - Create Baseline.
  - Create New Analysis.
  - View Prior Analysis Results.
  - Delete Baseline.

Fault Tree Linking

- Fault tree linking is the procedure in which the fault trees in an scenarios are logically combined


IE
PE1
OR
A
C
OR
A
B
$\mathrm{IE} \cdot \mathrm{PE1}$
$\mathrm{IE} \cdot \overline{\mathrm{PE1}}$

- Outcome is a Boolean function describing conditions under which a scenario is realized

Fault Tree Linking cont…

- Fault tree linking is achieved by combining fault tree BDD according to the logic of the event sequence diagram



Quantification of End State Types

- Scenarios in an ESD are mutually exclusive
- End state probability found through summation



Analysis Scope



Aggregation in System Hierarchy

- Summation of probabilities by end state
- Assumption of independence between initiating events



$$\Pr(MF) = \Pr(MF_1) + \Pr(MF_2) - \Pr(MF_1)\cdot\Pr(MF_2)$$

Viewing Aggregation Results

- If the Baseline and Analysis were created for full uncertainty propagation, the end state uncertainty results will be aggregated and shown.


QRAS - spaceshuttle - [Analysis Results]
File Edit Hierarchy Mission Timeline Failure Mode Quantification Event Sequence Diagram Analysis Sensitivity Analysis Tool Box Projects Help
Quantitative Result Total
Quantitative Result Ranking
Event Tree
Graph Title
CDF
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
10^{-6}
10^{-5}
10^{-4}
10^{-3}
Probability
PDF
CDF
Log X Axis
Unlocked

- Space Shuttle
  - SSMEs
    - SSME1
      - HPFTP
        - Inlet Sheet Metal/Thermal Shield Distortion
        - Inlet Sheet Metal Cracks
        - Thermal Shield Damage
        - Damper Pocket Cusp Cracks
        - Blade Platform Cracks Due to Thermal Tra
        - Housing Pilot Lip Failure
        - Housing Retaining Lug Failure
        - Nozzle Failure
        - Disk Fir Tree Yielding or Cracking
        - Fishmouth Seal Rubbing/Cracking
        - Turbine Blade Porosity
        - Turn Around Duct Failure
        - Stud Failure(Fails to Transmit Torque)
        - Impeller Failure
        - Volute Liner Fragmentation
        - Bearing Carrier Failure or Loss of Bolt Prel
        - Interstage Seal(RS007531) Excessive Cle
        - Stud Failure or Loss of Preload
        - Binding/Closure of Lift-Off Seal
        - Housing Structural Failure
        - Diffuser Cracks
      - HPOTP
        - Bearing Failure due to Wear or Corrosion
        - Failure due to Cavitation Damage
        - Turbine Nozzle Structural Failure
        - Retainer Ring Failure due to Loss of Bolt P
        - Turbine Blade Failure
        - Loss of Coolant to Bearings
        - Excessive Vibration
        - Turbine Shaft Failure
        - Loss of Coolant to Turbines
        - Loss of Bearing Retaining Bolt Preload
        - Excessive PBP Damping Seal Clearance
        - Loss of Bearing Retainer Nut Preload
      - MCC
        - Leakage into Closed Cavity
        - Delamination of Nickel Plating at the Aft En
        - Aft Manifold Weld Failure
        - Weld Failure
        - FRI Failure
      - Nozzle
        - Loss of TPS
        - Aft End Failure - Steerhorn, Feedlines, Aft M
        - Tube Leakage Failure due to Rupture
        - Jacket Failure due to Steps, Creases, and
      - Main Injector

Analysis: MCC-analysis - Run by Phase: Ascent - Uncertainty Propagation

Selected Level: MCC

Select End State: CAT

Total Risk at Selected Level

Point Estimate: 6.278E-5

Percentile	Value
5th	5.675e-06
10th	8.712e-06
15th	1.157e-05
20th	1.446e-05
25th	1.747e-05
30th	2.050e-05
35th	2.375e-05
40th	2.715e-05
45th	3.094e-05
50th	3.540e-05
55th	4.052e-05
60th	4.609e-05
65th	5.288e-05
70th	6.081e-05
75th	7.092e-05
80th	8.291e-05
85th	9.833e-05
90th	1.219e-04
95th	1.672e-04
Mean	5.464E-05

Event Tree


Q QRAS - spaceshuttle - [Analysis Results]
File Edit Hierarchy Mission Timeline Failure Mode Quantification Event Sequence Diagram Analysis Sensitivity Analysis Tool Box Projects Help
Space Shuttle
SSMEs
SSME1
HPFTP
Inlet Sheet Metal/Thermal Shield Distortion
Inlet Sheet Metal Cracks
Thermal Shield Damage
Damper Pocket Cusp Cracks
Blade Platform Cracks Due to Thermal Tra
Housing Pilot Lip Failure
Housing Retaining Lug Failure
Nozzle Failure
Disk Fir Tree Yielding or Cracking
Fishmouth Seal Rubbing/Cracking
Turbine Blade Porosity
Turn Around Duct Failure
Stud Failure(Fails to Transmit Torque)
Impeller Failure
Volute Liner Fragmentation
Bearing Carrier Failure or Loss of Bolt Prel
Interstage Seal(RS007531) Excessive Clea
Stud Failure or Loss of Preload
Binding/Closure of Lift-Off Seal
Housing Structural Failure
Diffuser Cracks
HPOTP
Quantitative Result Total
Quantitative Result Ranking
Event Tree
Unlocked

Analysis: New Analysis-hpftp - Run by Phase: Ascent - Uncertainty Propagation

Selected Level: Inlet Sheet Metal Cracks

IE	PE-2	PE-3	PE-4	PE-5	PE-6	EndState	Seq. #	Mean Prob.
2.190E-02	1.017E-01	4.762E-02	6.190E-01	6.364E-01	1.250E-01	CAT	1	5.223E-06
					8.750E-01	MS	2	3.656E-05
				3.636E-01		MS	3	2.388E-05
			3.810E-01			MS	4	4.040E-05
		9.524E-01				MS	5	2.121E-03
	8.983E-01					MS	6	1.967E-02

Mission Phase	OTI	Start	End	Unit	App
Ascent	1	-6.00	514.00	S	☒

Viewing Results Ranking



- Space Shuttle
  - SSMEs
    - SSME1
      - HPFTP
        - Inlet Sheet Metal/Thermal Shield Distortion
        - Inlet Sheet Metal Cracks
        - Thermal Shield Damage
        - Damper Pocket Cusp Cracks
        - Blade Platform Cracks Due to Thermal Tra
        - Housing Pilot Lip Failure
        - Housing Retaining Lug Failure
        - Nozzle Failure
        - Disk Fir Tree Yielding or Cracking
        - Fishmouth Seal Rubbing/Cracking
        - Turbine Blade Porosity
        - Turn Around Duct Failure
        - Stud Failure(Fails to Transmit Torque)
        - Impeller Failure
        - Volute Liner Fragmentation
        - Bearing Carrier Failure or Loss of Bolt Prel
        - Interstage Seal(RS007531) Excessive Clea
        - Stud Failure or Loss of Preload
        - Binding/Closure of Lift-Off Seal
        - Housing Structural Failure
        - Diffuser Cracks
      - HPOTP
        - Bearing Failure due to Wear or Corrosion
        - Failure due to Cavitation Damage
        - Turbine Nozzle Structural Failure
        - Retainer Ring Failure due to Loss of Bolt P
        - Turbine Blade Failure
        - Loss of Coolant to Bearings
        - Excessive Vibration
        - Turbine Shaft Failure
        - Loss of Coolant to Turbines
        - Loss of Bearing Retaining Bolt Preload

Analysis: New Analysis-hpftp - Run by Phase: Ascent - Uncertainty Propagation

Selected Level: HPFTP

Select End State: CAT

● Ranking by Scenario Probability

○ Ranking per Initiating Event / Failure Mode

Scenario Rank	Initiating Event	Scenario Probability	% of Risk Contribution
1	Turbine Blade Porosity: Ascent[1]	7.365e-05	35.61
2	Housing Retaining Lug Failure: Asce	2.907e-05	14.06
3	Stud Failure or Loss of Preload: Asc	1.696e-05	8.20
4	Housing Structural Failure: Ascent[1]	1.494e-05	7.22
5	Turn Around Duct Failure: Ascent[1]	9.484e-06	4.59
6	Housing Structural Failure: Ascent[1]	9.151e-06	4.42
7	Housing Structural Failure: Ascent[1]	6.952e-06	3.36
8	Housing Pilot Lip Failure: Ascent[1]	6.884e-06	3.33
9	Bearing Carrier Failure or Loss of Bo	5.937e-06	2.87
10	Damper Pocket Cusp Cracks: Ascer	5.362e-06	2.59
11	Inlet Sheet Metal Cracks: Ascent[1]	5.223e-06	2.53
12	Fishmouth Seal Rubbing/Cracking: /	4.003e-06	1.94
13	Stud Failure(Fails to Transmit Torqu	3.634e-06	1.76
14	Interstage Seal(RS007531) Excessi	2.932e-06	1.42
15	Fishmouth Seal Rubbing/Cracking: /	2.604e-06	1.26
16	Fishmouth Seal Rubbing/Cracking: /	2.431e-06	1.18
17	Nozzle Failure: Ascent[1]	1.915e-06	0.93

Viewing Scenario Details



Analysis: New Analysis-hpftp - Run by Phase: Ascent - Uncertainty Propagation

Selected Level: Inlet Sheet Metal Cracks Scenario: 5 End State Type: CAT

STATISTIC	VALUE
Mean	5.858E-06
1st	7.532E-09
5th	4.278E-08
10th	1.204E-07
50th	1.825E-06
90th	1.493E-05
95th	2.698E-05
99th	9.744E-05

In order to inspect the uncertainty distribution of the End Sate please , activate the "Quantify" button

Sensitivity Analysis

- A sensitivity analysis, also called a “what if” analysis, allows the user to:
  - Change quantifications of failure modes or ESD pivotal events.
  - Remove failure modes or subsystems.
  - Add failure modes or entire subsystems.
- The sensitivity analysis changes are not permanently stored.

Sensitivity Analysis Results Screen


QRAS - spaceshuttle - [Sensitivity Analysis Results]
File Edit Hierarchy Mission Timeline Failure Mode Quantification Event Sequence Diagram Analysis Sensitivity Analysis Tool Box Projects Help
Quantitative Result Total
Quantitative Result Ranking
Event Tree (Sensitivity)
Graph Title
CDF
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
10^{-7}
10^{-6}
10^{-5}
10^{-4}
10^{-3}
Probability
🟥 Original Analysis
🟩 Sensitivity Analysis
PDF
CDF
Log X Axis
Unlocked

- Space Shuttle
  - SSMEs
    - SSME1
      - HPFTP
        - Inlet Sheet Metal/Thermal Shield Distortion
        - Inlet Sheet Metal Cracks
        - Thermal Shield Damage
        - Damper Pocket Cusp Cracks
        - Blade Platform Cracks Due to Thermal Tra
        - Housing Pilot Lip Failure
        - Housing Retaining Lug Failure
        - Nozzle Failure
        - Disk Fir Tree Yielding or Cracking
        - Fishmouth Seal Rubbing/Cracking
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        - Stud Failure(Fails to Transmit Torque)
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        - Bearing Carrier Failure or Loss of Bolt Prel
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      - HPOTP
        - Bearing Failure due to Wear or Corrosion
        - Failure due to Cavitation Damage
        - Turbine Nozzle Structural Failure
        - Retainer Ring Failure due to Loss of Bolt P
        - Turbine Blade Failure
        - Loss of Coolant to Bearings
        - Excessive Vibration
        - Turbine Shaft Failure
        - Loss of Coolant to Turbines
        - Loss of Bearing Retaining Bolt Preload
        - Excessive PBP Damping Seal Clearance
        - Loss of Bearing Retainer Nut Preload
      - MCC (S)
        - Leakage into Closed Cavity (S)
        - Delamination of Nickel Plating at the Aft En
        - Weld Failure (S)
        - FRI Failure (S)
      - Nozzle
        - Loss of TPS
        - Aft End Failure - Steerhorn, Feedlines, Aft M
        - Tube Leakage Failure due to Rupture
        - Jacket Failure due to Steps, Creases, and
      - Main Injector
        - MIJ Blockage of an Oxidizer Orifice

Analysis: Sensitivity Analysis - Run by Phase: Ascent - Uncertainty Propagation

Selected Level: MCC

Select End State: CAT

Total Risk at Selected Level

Point Estimate: Original) 6.278E-5 (Sensitivity) 2.407E-5

Percentile	Original	Sensitivity
5th	5.675e-06	1.291e-06
10th	8.712e-06	2.220e-06
15th	1.157e-05	3.091e-06
20th	1.446e-05	3.951e-06
25th	1.747e-05	4.875e-06
30th	2.058e-05	5.912e-06
35th	2.375e-05	6.956e-06
40th	2.715e-05	8.082e-06
45th	3.094e-05	9.257e-06
50th	3.540e-05	1.060e-05
55th	4.052e-05	1.217e-05
60th	4.609e-05	1.391e-05
65th	5.288e-05	1.607e-05
70th	6.081e-05	1.868e-05
75th	7.092e-05	2.191e-05
80th	8.291e-05	2.618e-05
85th	9.833e-05	3.261e-05
90th	1.219e-04	4.374e-05
95th	1.672e-04	6.957e-05
Mean	5.464E-05	1.860E-05